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Abstract
We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership
agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed
about their production costs and engage in di¤erentiated good price competition. Partial
vertical integration entails an information vertical e¤ect: the partial misalignment of prot
objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer-retailer hierarchy involves costs from
asymmetric information that reduce the hierarchys protability. This translates into an
opposite competition horizontal e¤ect: the partially integrated hierarchy commits to a
higher retail price than under full integration, which strategically relaxes competition. The
equilibrium degree of vertical integration trades o¤ the benets of softer competition against
the informational costs.
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1. Introduction
Most of the practical and theoretical debate about the rmsorganizational structure in ver-
tically related markets has focused on two extreme alternatives, i.e., full vertical integration
and separation. However, we often observe the presence of partial vertical integration, namely,
partial ownership agreements in which a rm acquires less than 100% of shares in a vertically
related rm (e.g., Allen and Phillips 2000; Fee et al. 2006; Rei¤en 1998). Riordan (2008)
reports that in 2003 News Corp., a major owner of cable programming networks in the US,
acquired 34% of shares in Hughes Electronics, which operates via its wholly-owned subsidiary
DirectTV in the downstream market of direct broadcast satellite services. Gilo and Spiegel
(2011) provide empirical evidence that partial vertical integration is much more common than
full integration in telecommunication and media markets in Israel. For instance, Bezeq operates
in the broadband Internet infrastructure market and holds a share of 49.77% in DBS Satellite
Services, which competes in the downstream multi-channel broadcast market.
Despite the empirical relevance of this phenomenon, little theoretical attention has been
devoted to partial vertical ownership arrangements. In this paper, we investigate the incentive
of an upstream rm (manufacturer) to acquire a partial ownership stake in a downstream rm
(retailer). Our aim is to explore the scope for partial vertical integration and its competitive
e¤ects.
We address this question in a setting where two manufacturer-retailer hierarchies engage in
di¤erentiated good price competition and retailers are privately informed about their production
costs. The economic literature has emphasized since Crockers (1983) seminal contribution
that a major problem within a supply hierarchy is that a rm can have access to privileged
information about some relevant aspects of the market.
In our framework, a manufacturer exclusively deals with its retailer, which is reasonable in
the presence of product specic investments that have to be sunk before production decisions
take place.1 Moreover, bilateral contracting within the supply hierarchy is secret. This reects
the natural idea that the trading rules specied in a given contractual relationship cannot be
observed by competitors. Alternatively, these rules can be easily (secretly) renegotiated if both
parties agree to do so.2 In the benchmark case of full information within the supply hierarchy,
the manufacturer which can use non-linear (secret) contracts is indi¤erent about the ownership
1For theoretical justications of exclusive dealing in a context of asymmetric information, we refer to Gal-Or
(1991b).
2We refer to Martimort (1996) and Martimort and Piccolo (2010) for a justication of this approach.
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stake in its retailer. The manufacturer makes its retailer residual claimant for the hierarchys
prots and extracts these prots through a xed fee. This restores the outcome of vertical
integration irrespective of the ownership stake, and therefore vertical ownership arrangements
are inconsequential.
This result does not hold any longer in the presence of asymmetric information about the
retail costs. To begin with, consider a successive monopoly framework where a manufacturer-
retailer pair operates in isolation. It is well established in the economic literature (e.g., Gal-Or
1991c) that asymmetric information within a supply hierarchy entails a higher retail price to
reduce the (costly) informational rents to the retailer. This reduces the hierarchys e¢ ciency
whose joint prots are lower than under full information, and the manufacturer is therefore
induced to fully integrate with its retailer in order to internalize the negative externality within
the hierarchy.
This strict preference for full vertical integration does not carry over in a setting with
di¤erent manufacturer-retailer pairs engaging in di¤erentiated good price competition. We
show that in this setting partial vertical integration can emerge in equilibrium. In line with
the successive monopoly case, a partial vertical ownership agreement entails an information
vertical e¤ect: the partial misalignment between the prot objectives of the manufacturer and
the retailer entails allocative costs incurred to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the
retailer. For a given retail price charged by the competitor, the higher price from allocative
ine¢ ciency reduces the hierarchys protability relative to full integration.
This form of double marginalization from asymmetric information translates into an opposite
competition horizontal e¤ect: the partially integrated hierarchys commitment to a higher
retail price than under full integration induces an accommodating behavior of the rival and
strategically relaxes competition. The trade-o¤ between the benets of softer competition and
the costs of asymmetric information drives the equilibrium degree of vertical integration.
These results are presented in a fairly general setting without making any particular as-
sumption on functional forms. Our analysis recommends a careful antitrust investigation into
the competitive e¤ects of ownership agreements in vertically related markets.
2. Related literature
The private and social e¤ects of partial ownership agreements in horizontally related markets
have been well explored in the economic literature (e.g., Gilo et al. 2006). A seminal recent
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paper on this topic is Foros et al. (2011), which shows that a rm can prefer the acquisition
of a partial ownership stake in a rival to full merger, if it obtains the corporate control over all
price decisions.
Conversely, the literature on partial ownership in vertically related markets is still in its
infancy. A relevant contribution is Dasgupta and Tao (2000), which demonstrates that partial
vertical ownership may perform better than take-or-pay contracts if the upstream rms under-
take investments which benet downstream rms. However, Greenlee and Raskovich (2006) nd
that, under certain circumstances, partial vertical ownership interests do not have any e¤ect on
the price or output choices of downstream rms.3 In this paper, we show that partial vertical
integration constitutes a strategic devise to relax competition in the presence of asymmetric
information about the retail costs.
Our analysis is also related to the literature about the strategic choice between vertical
separation and integration when supply hierarchies compete. This issue has been investigated
in a setting of complete information (e.g., Bonanno and Vickers 1988; Gal-Or 1991a; Jansen
2003) and, more relevantly for our purposes, in a context of asymmetric information. Caillaud
and Rey (1994) provide an overview of the strategic use of vertical delegation. Gal-Or (1992)
shows that, in the presence of asymmetric information about the retail costs, for intermediate
costs of integration one rm nds it optimal to integrate while its rival remains vertically
separated. Barros (1997) demonstrates that in an oligopolistic industry some rms may prot
from a commitment to face asymmetric information about their agents operations. Along
these lines, Gal-Or (1999) derives the conditions under which vertically related rms follow
di¤erent strategies about the integration or separation of their sale functions when asymmetric
information concerns consumer demand. Di¤erently from the aforementioned contributions,
we consider the manufacturers option of ne-tuning the degree of vertical integration by
acquiring a (possibly) partial ownership stake in its retailer.
Our paper also belongs to the strand of literature dealing with vertical restraints under
asymmetric information. In a successive monopoly framework with adverse selection, Gal-Or
(1991c) compares quantity xing and resale price maintenance contracts. Martimort (1996)
investigates the choice of competing manufacturers between a common or exclusive retailer and
3 In a setting with an upstream homogeneous product and downstream imperfect competition, Hunold et al.
(2012) show that passive (non-controlling) ownership of downstream rms in upstream rms is more protable
than full merger. Gilo et al. (2013) nd that partial ownership acquisitions can increase the risk of anticompetitive
foreclosure relative to full integration.
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shows that this choice depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation and the extent of the
adverse selection problem. In a model with adverse selection and moral hazard, Martimort
and Piccolo (2007) qualify the results of Gal-Or (1991c) according to the retailerstechnology
for providing services. In a setting with competing manufacturer-retailer pairs, Martimort and
Piccolo (2010) and Kastl et al. (2011) show that manufacturers may strategically prefer quantity
xing over resale price maintenance contracts and investigate the welfare consequences of these
contractual relationships.
Our contribution also shares some relevant similarities with the literature on strategic del-
egation in a competitive environment. However, contrary to the early work (e.g., Fershtman
and Judd 1987), we consider an asymmetric information setting with secret contracts (e.g.,
Martimort 1996), where the terms of trade cannot be used for strategic purposes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 sets out the formal model. Section
4 considers the benchmark setting of a manufacturer informed about its retail costs, which
is indi¤erent whether to integrate with its retailer or not. Section 5 investigates the case
of asymmetric information and shows that the manufacturer can nd it optimal to partially
integrate with its privately informed retailer rather than fully integrate. In an illustrative
example with explicit functions, Section 6 derives the equilibrium degree of partial vertical
integration. Section 7 explores alternatives assumptions and the robustness of the results.
Section 8 discusses some implications for the antitrust policy. Section 9 concludes. All formal
proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3. The model
Setting We consider a vertically related market, where two upstream manufacturers, M1
and M2, provide symmetrically di¤erentiated goods through two downstream retailers, R1 and
R2, which engage in price competition. We assume that each manufacturer is in an exclusive
relationship with one retailer. To make the analysis as sharp as possible for our aims, in the
spirit of Martimort and Piccolo (2010) we consider a setting where manufacturerM1 and retailer
R1 exclusively deal with each other, while manufacturerM2 is fully integrated with retailer R2.4
Let qi (pi; p i) denote the (direct) demand function for good i = 1; 2, which is decreasing
and (weakly) concave in its own price pi, i.e.,
@qi
@pi
< 0 and @
2qi
@p2i
 0. Goods exhibit some
4As discussed in Section 7, our results carry over in a more symmetric setting where both supply hierarchies
decide on the ownership stake in their retailers.
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degree of substitutability, i.e., @qi@p i > 0 (the equality holds if and only if market demands are
independent). We impose
 @qi@pi  > @qi@p i , which implies that own-price e¤ects are larger than
cross-price e¤ects. We also assume @
2qi
@pi@p i  0, which ensures strategic complementarity in
prices.5 Manufacturing costs are normalized to zero.
Manufacturer M1 o¤ers retailer R1 a contract which species a retail price p1 for the good
and a xed franchise fee t1 paid by the retailer to the manufacturer for the right to sell the
good.6 Retailer R1s (interim expected) prots are
R1 = p1E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 )  1E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 )  t1, (1)
where 1 2 fl; hg is the marginal retail cost, whose realization is private information of the
retailer at the time the contract is signed. With probability  2 (0; 1) costs are l, while with
probability 1   costs are h, where   h   l > 0. Moreover, E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 ) represents
the expected quantity of R1, which is conditional on its own retail costs 1. This is because
R1 is uncertain about the rivals retail costs when contracting with M1 but it can update its
information on the basis of its cost realization. Specically, in line with the main literature (e.g.,
Gal-Or 1991b, 1999; Martimort 1996), we allow for (weakly) positive correlation between retail
costs.7 In the example provided in Section 6, we assume perfect cost correlation, i.e., 1 = 2.
Manufacturer M1s (interim expected) prots are
M1 = t1 +  [p1E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 )  1E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 )  t1] , (2)
which is a weighted sum of upstream prots from the franchise fee t1 and downstream prots
R1 in (1) from retail operations. When o¤ering a contract to R1, M1 is concerned about the
prots in (2). The parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the ownership stake acquired byM1 in R1. In
the words of OBrien and Salop (2000),  captures the nancial interest of the acquiring rm,
which is entitled to receive a share of the prots of the acquired rm. If  = 0, the two rms
5This implies that the best response functions are positively sloped (Bulow et al. 1985). We refer to Vives
(1999, Ch. 6) for a full characterization of standard regularity conditions which ensure that there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium outcome.
6This contractual mode yields the manufacturer the highest prot. The practice of dictating the nal price
to a retailer is commonly known as resale price maintenance. As discussed in Section 7, our qualitative results
are una¤ected if we consider a two-part tari¤ contract.
7Positive correlation is reasonable in competitive markets, where costs are usually subject to common trends.
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are perfectly separated. If  2 (0; 1), M1 acquires an ownership share in R1, which means that
the two rms are partially integrated. If  = 1, M1 wholly owns R1, and full integration occurs.
We wish to derive the equilibrium degree of vertical integration between manufacturer M1
and retailer R1, namely, the ownership stake  that M1 decides to acquire in R1. Following
the main literature on partial ownership (e.g., Foros et al. 2011; Greenlee and Raskovich 2006;
Hunold et al. 2012), we assume thatM1 chooses the ownership stake  in R1 that maximizes the
(expected) joint prots of the two rms. This ensures that M1 can design an o¤er to R1 which
makes the shareholders in both rms better o¤, so that they will nd it mutually benecial to
sign such an agreement.8 Note that, ifM1 chose  to maximize its prots in (2), it could o¤er R1
a new vertical ownership agreement that maximizes joint prots together with a transfer which
makes R1 indi¤erent and it would be strictly better o¤. Therefore, a joint prot maximizing
ownership agreement exhibits a higher commitment value. In Section 7, we qualify our results
for the case where the manufacturer maximizes its own prots when deciding on .
In order to focus on the strategic e¤ects of acquisition, we abstract from any cost savings
arising from the ownership arrangement.
The (interim expected) prots of the vertical structure M2  R2 are
2 = p2E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 )  2E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 ) , (3)
where E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 ) represents the expected quantity of M2   R2, which is conditional on
its own retail costs 2 whose realization is private information. The two competing supply hier-
archies do not know the cost of each other but, as stressed before, costs are (weakly) positively
correlated.9
Contracting In line with the main literature on competing supply hierarchies (e.g., Gal-Or
1999; Martimort 1996; Martimort and Piccolo 2010, Kastl et al. 2011), bilateral contracting
within the hierarchy is secret. We invoke the revelation principle (e.g., Myerson 1982) in order
8 In a similar vein, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) suggest the criterion of joint prots to derive the equilibrium
ownership stake. This approach also reects the practice of takeovers and acquisitions. For instance, in the US
a bidder that makes an o¤er to purchase less than 100% of the shares of a rm must accept all shares tendered
on a pro-rated basis. For additional details about the takeover process, we refer to Hunt (2009, p. 524).
9As it will become clear later, since M2   R2 is vertically integrated, our results fully carry over even when
the upstream manufacturer M2 does not know the costs of its downstream division R2. Moreover, even though
we allow for (possibly) di¤erent probability distributions for 1 and 2, we adopt the same expectation operator
E (:) to simplify notation.
7
to characterize the set of incentive feasible allocations. In our setting, this means that, for
any strategy choice of M2   R2, there is no loss of generality in deriving the best response of
M1 within the class of direct incentive compatible mechanisms. Specically, manufacturer M1
o¤ers its retailer R1 a direct contract menu
n
t1
b1 ; p1 b1ob12fl;hg, which determines a
xed franchise fee t1 (:) and a retail price p1 (:) contingent on the retailers report b1 2 fl; hg
about its costs. This contract menu must be incentive compatible, namely, it must induce the
retailer to report truthfully its costs, which implies b1 = 1 in equilibrium.10
It is worth noting that this contract mechanism is incomplete, since manufacturerM1 cannot
contract upon the retail price of the competitor M2  R2.11 This assumption, which is familiar
in the literature (e.g., Gal-Or 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1999; Martimort 1996; Martimort and Piccolo
2010; Kastl et al. 2011), can be justied on several grounds. For instance, a contract contingent
on the retail price of the competitor may be condemned as collusive practice by antitrust
authorities.12
Timing The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
(I) M1 decides on what ownership stake  2 [0; 1] to acquire in R1.
(II) R1 and M2  R2 privately learn their respective retail costs 1 2 fl; hg and 2.
(III) M1 secretly makes an o¤er
n
t1
b1 ; p1 b1ob12fl;hg to R1. The o¤er can be either
rejected or accepted by R1.13 If the o¤er is rejected, each rm obtains its outside option
(normalized to zero), while M2 R2 acts as a monopolist. If the o¤er is accepted, R1 picks one
element within the contract menu by sending a report b1 2 fl; hg about the realized retail
costs. Price competition with M2  R2 takes place and payments are made.
The solution concept we adopt is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, with the additional passive
beliefs renement (e.g., Martimort 1996; Martimort and Piccolo 2010, Kastl et al. 2011).
Whenever R1 receives an unexpected o¤er from M1, it does not change its beliefs about the
10Since the manufacturer can obtain (a part of) the retailers prots, it might infer the value of the retail
costs and design a penalty which extracts all prots of the retailer following from cost misreporting. However,
this penalty is unfeasible under a range of reasonable circumstances. The prot realization may be a¤ected by
random shocks (occurring after rmsdecisions take place) which prevent the detection of the true costs. In the
presence of limited liability, it would be hard to implement a ne which deters cost misreporting. Furthermore,
the ne implemented by the manufacturer would have the only e¤ect of expropriating the prots of the other
shareholders of the retailer. This would be interpreted as a violation of their rights and condemned by antitrust
authorities.
11Similarly, the contract cannot be made contingent on any report from M2  R2 about its retail costs.
12Alternatively, the retail price charged by the rival can be hard to observe or verify because of the lack of the
proper auditing rights. We refer to Martimort (1996) for a discussion of this assumption.
13This is justied in the literature by assuming that a retailer is selected from a very large population of
(equally ex ante e¢ cient) potential rms, so that the manufacturer can dictate the terms of trade in the contract.
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equilibrium strategy of M2  R2.
Proceeding backward, we rst compute the retail prices in the competition stage for a given
ownership stake. Afterwards, we derive the equilibrium ownership stake.
4. Benchmark: manufacturer fully informed about its retail costs
To better appreciate how the strategic value of partial ownership arrangements follows from the
presence of asymmetric information, we rst consider the benchmark case where manufacturer
M1 is fully informed about its retail costs.
We formalize the main results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If manufacturer M1 is fully informed about the costs 1 of its retailer R1, the equi-
librium retail price pfii , i = 1; 2, satises
E

qi

pfii ; p
fi
 i

ji

+

pfii   i
 @E qi pfii ; pfi i ji
@pi
= 0. (4)
The equilibrium ownership stake that M1 holds in R1 is any  2 [0; 1].
The retail price of each supply hierarchy is set above marginal costs in order to equate
(expected) marginal revenues with (expected) marginal costs from retailing.
The problem of manufacturer M1 reduces to the problem of the vertical structure M2 R2.
Since contracting is secret and cannot be used for strategic purposes, a fully informed manu-
facturer using non-linear contracts nds it optimal to fully remove the double marginalization
problem by making its retailer residual claimant for the hierarchys total prots, which are
extracted through a xed fee. As a result, the manufacturer achieves the outcome of full in-
tegration irrespective of the ownership stake , and the choice about the degree of vertical
integration is inconsequential.
This conclusion does not hold any longer in the presence of asymmetric information.
5. The case of asymmetric information
We now consider the setting where retailer R1 privately knows its costs. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3, manufacturer M1 can restrict attention to a direct incentive compatible contract menun
t1
b1 ; p1 b1ob12fl;hg which induces retailer R1 to truthfully reveal its costs, i.e., b1 = 1.
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This contract menu can be written as f(t1l; p1l) ; (t1h; p1h)g, where (t1l; p1l) and (t1h; p1h) repre-
sent the contracts designed for the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer, with costs l and h respec-
tively.
5.1. The competition stage
We rst derive the retail prices for a given ownership stake. In addition to the participation con-
straints R1l  0 and R1h  0 for the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer respectively, the contract
o¤ered by manufacturer M1 to retailer R1 must satisfy the following incentive compatibility
constraints
R1l = p1lE (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )  lE (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )  t1l
 p1hE (q1 (p1h; p2) jl )  lE (q1 (p1h; p2) jl )  t1h
= R1h + p1h [E (q1 (p1h; p2) jl )  E (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )]
+ hE (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  lE (q1 (p1h; p2) jl )
= R1h + E (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  (p1h   l) [E (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  E (q1 (p1h; p2) jl )]
(5)
R1h = p1hE (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  hE (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  t1h
 p1lE (q1 (p1l; p2) jh )  hE (q1 (p1l; p2) jh )  t1l
= R1l + p1l [E (q1 (p1l; p2) jh )  E (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )]
+ lE (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )  hE (q1 (p1l; p2) jh )
= R1l  E (q1 (p1l; p2) jl ) + (p1l   h) [E (q1 (p1l; p2) jh )  E (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )] .
(6)
Conditions (5) and (6) ensure that retailer R1 does not benet from misreporting its costs.
The participation constraint R1h  0 for the ine¢ cient retailer and the incentive constraint
(5) for the e¢ cient retailer are binding at the optimal contract.14 Substituting these binding
constraints, M1s problem of maximizing its (expected) prots in (2) can be formulated in the
14Otherwise, manufacturer M1 could increase the franchise fee and be better o¤. We check in the proof of
Proposition 1 in the Appendix that the two remaining constraints are satised in equilibrium.
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following way
max
p1l;p1h
 fp1lE (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )  lE (q1 (p1l; p2) jl )  (1  )
 [E (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  (p1h   l) (E (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  E (q1 (p1h; p2) jl )))]g
+ (1  ) fp1hE (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )  hE (q1 (p1h; p2) jh )g , (7)
where the two expressions in curly brackets are the manufacturers prots generated with the
e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer, respectively.
Using (3), the problem of the vertical structure M2  R2 is
max
p2
p2E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 )  2E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 ) . (8)
We now derive the retail prices for a given ownership stake .
Proposition 1 If retailer R1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 fl; hg, the retail price
charged by R1 is pai1 2

pai1l ; p
ai
1h
	
, where pai1l and p
ai
1h satisfy respectively
E
 
q1
 
pai1l ; p
ai
2
 jl +  pai1l   l @E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jl @p1 = 0 (9)
E
 
q1
 
pai1h; p
ai
2
 jh +  pai1h   h @E  q1  pai1h; pai2  jh @p1    () (1  )

"

@E
 
q1
 
pai1h; p
ai
2
 jh 
@p1
  E  q1  pai1h; pai2  jh + E  q1  pai1h; pai2  jl 
   pai1h   l
 
@E
 
q1
 
pai1h; p
ai
2
 jh 
@p1
  @E
 
q1
 
pai1h; p
ai
2
 jl 
@p1
!#
= 0, (10)
with  ()  1  . Furthermore, the retail price pai2 charged by the supply hierarchy M2   R2
satises
E
 
q2
 
pai1 ; p
ai
2
 j2 +  pai2   2 @E  q2  pai1 ; pai2  j2 @p2 = 0. (11)
This yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2 It holds that (i) @p
ai
1l
@ < 0, (ii)
@pai1h
@ < 0, (iii)
@pai2
@ < 0.
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Under asymmetric information, the e¢ cient retailer commands some informational rents in
(5) which, as (7)) reveals, are costly for manufacturer M1 when it does not full internalize the
retailers prots, i.e.,  < 1. To reduce these rents, the price in (10) of the ine¢ cient retailer
is distorted above the full information level, which generates allocative costs within the supply
hierarchy.15 The magnitude of this form of double marginalization from asymmetric information
depends on the ownership stake  that determinesM1s degree of internalization of R1s prots.
As Lemma 2 indicates, higher values for  translate into a lower price of the ine¢ cient retailer,
since M1 internalizes to a larger extent R1s prots. In particular, with a full acquisition of R1
( = 1), M1 maximizes joint prots in (7) and R1s rents are not costly any longer. This fully
removes the informational costs and the retail price reects its full information level in (4).
The best response function of the e¢ cient retailer coincides with that under full information.
This is because the informational rents in (5) are independent of the price of the e¢ cient retailer
and therefore manufacturerM1 does not nd it protable to implement any distortion. However,
the price in (9) charged by the e¢ cient retailer generally di¤ers from the price in (4) under full
information if  < 1. To understand the rationale for this result, consider the price in (11)
charged by M2   R2.16 Given strategic complementarity in prices, a lower value for , which
entails an increase in the price charged by the ine¢ cient retailer, induces M2   R2 to set a
higher price, as shown in Lemma 2. The e¢ cient retailer also increases its price in response to
the higher price charged by the competitor.
It is worth noting that this result depends on the fact that M2   R2 cannot distinguish
between the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient retailer and therefore it determines its price on the basis of
the (conditional) expectation about the rivals retail costs. As we will see in Section 5, when
costs are perfectly correlated, M2   R2 certainly knows the rivals costs, and therefore it does
not distort its price when the retailer is e¢ cient. As a consequence, in this case both the price
of M2  R2 and the price of the e¢ cient retailer reect their full information values.
5.2. The equilibrium ownership stake
Having derived the retail prices for a given ownership stake of manufacturer M1 in its retailer
R1, we can go back to the rst stage of the game and determine the equilibrium ownership
15The expression in square brackets in (10) is negative. This result is reminiscent of the rent extraction-e¢ ciency
trade-o¤ in optimal regulation (e.g., Baron and Myerson 1982).
16The best response function of M2   R2 is also the same as under full information. This result would apply
even under asymmetric information within the vertical structure, since manufacturer M2, which maximizes joint
prots, would not nd it protable to distort the price of its privately informed division R2.
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stake. Since M1 chooses how much of R1 to acquire in order to maximize joint prots, the
equilibrium ownership stake is the solution to the following maximization program
max
2[0;1]


pai1l ()E
 
q1
 
pai1l () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jl   lE  q1  pai1l () ; pai2 () jl 
+ (1  ) pai1h ()E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh   hE  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh  . (12)
We are now in a position to show our main results.
Proposition 2 If retailer R1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 fl; hg, the equilibrium
ownership stake that manufacturer M1 holds in its retailer R1 is ai < 1 whenever market de-
mands are interdependent ( @qi@p i > 0). Equivalently, partial vertical integration is more protable
than full vertical integration. Full vertical integration, i.e., ai = 1, emerges in equilibrium if
and only if market demands are independent ( @qi@p i = 0).
Proposition 2 indicates that, in the presence of asymmetric information, M1 is no longer
indi¤erent about its ownership stake in R1. Specically, when facing competition in the retail
market, M1 nds it desirable to acquire an ownership interest in R1 which is strictly lower
than full ownership, i.e., ai < 1. We know from the discussion following Proposition 1 that a
partial misalignment between prot objectives within the partially integrated hierarchy induces
a higher retail price of the ine¢ cient retailer to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the
e¢ cient retailer. For a given price charged by the competitor M2   R2, this form of double
marginalization from asymmetric information reduces the e¢ ciency of the supply hierarchy
M1  R1. These informational costs constitute what we call information vertical e¤ect.
In the presence of price competition, this e¤ect translates into an opposite competition
horizontal e¤ect. The partially integrated hierarchy M1   R1 commits to a higher retail price
than under full integration, which induces the competitor M2   R2 to raise its price as well.
Consequently, partial vertical integration acts as a strategic device to relax competition.
The equilibrium degree of integration trades o¤ the benets of softer competition against
the informational costs. Only if markets are independent and therefore there is no benet of
softer competition, a pattern of full vertical integration that completely removes informational
costs is clearly preferable. In the sequel, using explicit functions, we derive the equilibrium
degree of vertical integration.
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6. An illustrative example
For the sake of concreteness, we now consider a setting with explicit functions. Specically, the
consumer demand takes the following linear form
qRi =   pRi + pR i , (13)
where  and  are positive parameters, and  2 [0; ) denotes the degree of substitutability
between goods.17 The prots of retailer R1, manufacturerM1, and the vertical structureM2 R2
are respectively given by (1), (2), and (3), with retail costs being now perfectly correlated, i.e.,
1 = 2 2 fl; hg.
The following lemma collects the main results with a fully informed manufacturer.
Lemma 3 If manufacturer M1 is fully informed about the costs 1 of its retailer R1, the equi-
librium retail price pfii , i = 1; 2, is
pfii =
+ i
2    . (14)
The equilibrium ownership stake that M1 holds in R1 is any  2 [0; 1].
We know from Lemma 1 that, in the absence of asymmetric information, retail prices are
set e¢ ciently. As costs are perfectly correlated, the equilibrium prices in (14) charged by the
two supply hierarchies coincide.
We now turn to the problem under asymmetric information. Substituting (13) into (5) and
(6), the incentive compatibility constraints can be written as
R1l = p1l (  p1l + p2l)  l (  p1l + p2l)  t1l
 p1h (  p1h + p2l)  l (  p1h + p2l)  t1h
= R1h + p1h (p2l   p2h) + h (  p1h + p2h)  l (  p1h + p2l)
= R1h +  (  p1h + p2h)   (p2h   p2l) (p1h   l) (15)
17The system of demands in (13) follows from the optimization problem of a unit mass of identical consumers
with a quasi-linear utility function y + U (q1; q2), where y is the Hicksian composite commodity and U (q1; q2) =
a (q1 + q2)   12
 
bq21 + bq
2
2 + 2gq1q2

, with a > 0, b > g  0, and   a(b g)
b2 g2 ,   bb2 g2 ,   gb2 g2 (e.g., Vives
1999, Ch. 6).
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R1h = p1h (  p1h + p2h)  h (  p1h + p2h)  t1h
 p1l (  p1l + p2h)  h (  p1l + p2h)  t1l
= R1l + p1l (p2h   p2l)  h (  p1l + p2h) + l (  p1l + p2l)
= R1l   (  p1l + p2l) +  (p2h   p2l) (p1l   h) , (16)
where p1l and p1h are the retail prices charged by R1, while p2l and p2h are the prices charged
by M2  R2, with costs l and h respectively. Under perfect cost correlation, R1 and M2  R2
certainly know the costs of each other.
As in Section 5, we rst derive the retail prices for a given ownership stake .
Proposition 3 If retailer R1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 fl; hg, the retail price
charged by R1 is pai1 2

pai1l ; p
ai
1h
	
, where
pai1l =
+ l
2    (17)
pai1h =
(+ h)
 
42   2+  () (1  ) 43   2 (+ h)
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))] , (18)
with  ()  1  . Furthermore, the retail price charged by the supply hierarchy M2   R2 is
pai2 2

pai2l ; p
ai
2h
	
, where
pai2l =
+ l
2    (19)
pai2h =
(+ h)
 
42   2+  () (1  ) 22    (+ h)
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))] . (20)
Proposition 3 illustrates with explicit results the main insights gleaned from Proposition 1.
We know that the best response functions of the e¢ cient retailer R1 and of the vertical structure
M2 R2 coincide with those under full information. Note that the prices in (17) and (19) reect
their full information values in (4). With perfectly correlated costs, M2   R2 certainly knows
whether it faces the e¢ cient retailer, whose price is not distorted for rent reduction purposes.
Therefore, their prices are the same as under full information.
Conversely, the price in (18) charged by the ine¢ cient retailer can be inated above the full
information level to reduce the informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer. The price di¤erence
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between (18) and (14) amounts to 4
3()(1 )
(2 )[42 2(1+(1 ))]  0, which vanishes if and only if
 = 1. This measures the impact of the ownership stake on retail pricing. Di¤erentiating (18)
yields
@pai1h
@
=   4
3 (2   )  ()
[42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2 < 0, (21)
namely, a lower ownership stake  exacerbates the price upward distortion. This is because M1
internalizes to a lesser extent the prots in (15) of the e¢ cient retailer and therefore is more
inclined to curb these prots via a price increase. For a given price charged by the competitor
M2   R2, the supply hierarchy M1   R1 becomes more ine¢ cient, since it obtains lower joint
prots. However, in the presence of price competition, the rival M2   R2 responds to a price
change by adjusting its price in the same direction. In particular, di¤erentiating (20) yields
@pai2h
@
=   4
2 (2   )  ()
[42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2 < 0 (22)
for  > 0. A lower ownership stake of M1 in R1 translates into higher retail prices for both
supply hierarchies. Note from (21) and (22) that the price response ofM2 R2 to a change in 
is smoother than the price response of M1 R1. Hence, even though the two supply hierarchies
share the same retail costs, M1 R1 is weaker vis-à-vis its rival, since the price in (18) is higher
than the price in (20) for  < 1.
The following proposition illustrates the result of the trade-o¤ between the benets of softer
competition and the informational costs.
Proposition 4 If retailer R1 is privately informed about its costs 1 2 fl; hg, the equilibrium
ownership stake that manufacturer M1 holds in its retailer R1 is
ai = 1  
2
 
42   2 (  (   ) h)
 () [83 (22   2) + 4 (  (   ) h)] . (23)
It holds ai < 1 whenever market demands are interdependent ( 6= 0). In particular, we have
(i) partial vertical integration, i.e., ai 2 (0; 1), if  () > 
2(42 2)( ( )h)
83(22 2)+4( ( )h) ;
(ii) full vertical separation, i.e., ai = 0, otherwise.
Full vertical integration, i.e., ai = 1, is preferable if and only if market demands are
independent ( = 0).
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Proposition 4 indicates that, when market demands are interdependent, M1 nds it optimal
to partially integrate with R1 if the retailer is relatively likely to be e¢ cient ( () increases
with ). A higher probability  of the e¢ cient retailer translates into larger expected (costly)
informational rents and therefore higher informational costs within the hierarchy. If  is high
enough, M1 is induced to acquire a partial nancial interest in R1, which mitigates the infor-
mational distortions. For lower values of , the informational costs within the hierarchy are
relatively small. In this case, M1 fully separates from R1 and benets from softer competition
by committing to the highest possible prices. Conversely, a pattern of full integration, which
completely removes the informational costs, is optimal if and only if the hierarchy acts as a
monopolist, since there is no benet of relaxing competition.
Note from (23) that an increase in the spread of retail cost distribution  results in a
higher ai. When the asymmetric information problem is more severe, the higher informational
costs associated with R1s rents induce M1 to mitigate these costs through a larger degree of
vertical integration.
The result in Proposition 4 that the ownership stake of M1 in R1 is lower than 100% holds
whenever market demands are interdependent ( 6= 0). Hence, partial vertical integration can
emerge in the presence of complementary goods ( < 0), which entail strategic substitutability
in prices in a linear demand setting. As (21) and (22) indicate, a higher price of the ine¢ cient
retailer R1 arising from a lower ownership stake than under full integration translates now into
a lower price for the complementary good provided by M2  R2. This stimulates the output of
M1  R1, which is therefore better o¤.
7. Robustness
We now discuss some assumptions of the model to gain insights into the robustness of the
results.
7.1. Derivation of the equilibrium value for the ownership stake
Following the main literature on partial ownership, we have derived the equilibrium ownership
stake of M1 in R1 from the joint prot maximization problem. As discussed in Section 3, this
ensures that M1 can design an o¤er to R1 which makes the shareholders in both rms better
o¤, so that they will nd it mutually protable to accept this o¤er. We now examine the case
in which M1, instead of caring about joint prots, chooses  in order to maximize the prots
17
in (2) it expects from the relationship with R1. Using (2) and the binding condition for R1s
prots in (5), the equilibrium value for  is solution to the following maximization problem
max
2[0;1]


pai1l ()E
 
q1
 
pai1l () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jl   lE  q1  pai1l () ; pai2 () jl 
  (1  ) E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh 
   pai1h ()  l E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh   E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jl 	
+ (1  ) pai1h ()E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh   hE  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh  . (24)
This yields the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that manufacturer M1 chooses the ownership stake  in its retailer R1
to maximize the prots in (2) rather than joint prots. If the probability of the e¢ cient retailer
 is relatively low and market demands are interdependent ( @qi@p i > 0), then the equilibrium
ownership stake is ai < 1.
Proposition 5 shows that, under certain circumstances, partial integration is more protable
than full integration even though it is not the result of joint prot maximization. Specically,
M1 does not acquire full ownership in R1 when the e¢ cient retailer is relatively unlikely and
therefore its (expected) informational rents are not too costly. A manufacturer which only cares
about its own prots when deciding on the ownership stake overestimates the informational costs
relative to a joint prot maximizer, since it takes also into consideration the fact that it is not
able to fully extract the prots of its retailer. As a result, a full integration pattern which
mitigates the informational costs may be preferred if the probability of the e¢ cient retailer is
relatively high.
7.2. Fully integrated competitor
Another assumption that deserves further discussion is that M1 faces the fully integrated com-
petitor M2   R2 when deciding on the ownership stake in R1. Note that this modeling choice
allows the investigation of the unilateral incentive to partially integrate in a setting which is
biased in favor of the decision of full integration. The vertical structure M2 R2 does not have
any negative externality from asymmetric information and can only benet from M1s higher
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price. This clearly mitigates M1s incentive to incur informational costs to commit to a higher
price.
A more symmetric framework where both supply hierarchies are allowed to choose the
ownership stake in their retailers would facilitate a commitment to higher prices via partial
ownership agreements, which strengthens the outcome of partial vertical integration.
7.3. Resale price maintenance
The contract that manufacturer M1 o¤ers to the retailer R1 directly species the retail price,
which is known as resale price maintenance. Even though this type of vertical arrangements
is sometimes viewed with skepticism by the antitrust authorities, some countries (e.g., New
Zealand) traditionally allow this practice if the benecial e¤ects can be shown to outweigh the
anticompetitive harm. In the 2007 case Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., vs. PSKS,
Inc. the US Supreme Court held that resale price maintenance agreements are not per se
unlawful, but must be judged under a rule of reason, which allows a rm to produce evidence
that an individual resale price maintenance agreement is justied.18
Remarkably, our qualitative results do not depend on the use of resale price maintenance
agreements. For instance, consider a contract which stipulates a two-part tari¤ with a unit
input price and a xed fee the retailer pays to the manufacturer. In the presence of asymmetric
information, the manufacturer is inclined to distort upward the unit input price in order to
reduce the informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer, according to the ownership stake acquired
by the manufacturer in the retailer. This results in a higher retail price, which yields the trade-
o¤ investigated in the paper.
8. Antitrust policy implications
Our analysis emphasizes the strategic use of partial ownership arrangements to relax compe-
tition. Despite the huge empirical literature on vertical integration (exhaustively surveyed by
Lafontaine and Slade 2007), more research is warranted on the impact of the rmsorganiza-
tional structure on competition. Using appropriate econometric techniques, the predictions of
our model lend themselves for an empirically testable validation.
Our results recommend careful investigations into partial ownership agreements that can
18There is also some empirical evidence about the presence of resale price maintenance arrangements in Europe
(see Bonnet and Bubois (2010) for the French water industry).
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facilitate a dampening of competition. Furthermore, takeover regulations could facilitate full
acquisitions relative to partial equity holdings. Antitrust authorities should allow partial own-
ership agreements when e¢ ciency benets (for instance, in terms of cost savings) are expected
to o¤set the anticompetitive e¤ects of rmsstrategic behavior.
Partial ownership agreements for strategic purposes will typically emerge in markets char-
acterized by price competition. Therefore, we do not generally expect any strategic partial
ownership when severe capacity constraints induce Cournot competition. This is because the
partially integrated hierarchys output reduction to curb informational rents entails a more
aggressive behavior of the rival.
9. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the scope for partial ownership agreements in vertically
related markets where two manufacturer-retailer pairs engage in di¤erentiated good price com-
petition and retailers are privately informed about their production costs.
A partial ownership stake of a manufacturer in its retailer, which introduces a misalignment
between prot objectives of the two rms, entails an upward price distortion for the ine¢ cient
retailer to reduce the (costly) informational rents to the e¢ cient retailer. This form of double
marginalization from asymmetric information reduces the supply hierarchys e¢ ciency for a
given price of the competitor.
This information vertical e¤ect translates into an opposite competition horizontal e¤ect.
The hierarchys commitment to a higher price induces the rival to increase its price, which
relaxes competition. The equilibrium degree of vertical integration trades o¤ the benets of
softer competition against the informational costs.
Our analysis explores the strategic incentive for partial vertical ownership and gives recom-
mendations to the antitrust authorities when investigating mergers and acquisitions in vertically
related markets.
Appendix
This appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting t1 with R1 from (1), M1s problem of maximizing (2) can
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be written as
max
p1;R1
p1E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 )  1E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 )  (1  )R1
s:t: R1  0,
where the constraint ensures the participation of R1 in the contractual relationship with M1.
Since the maximand decreases with R1 for any  2 [0; 1], we have R1 = 0 in equilibrium.
Taking the rst-order condition for p1 yields E (q1 (p1; p2) j1 ) + (p1   1) @E(q1(p1;p2)j1 )@p1 = 0.
Using (3), the problem of M2  R2 is
max
p2
p2E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 )  2E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 ) ,
which entails E (q2 (p1; p2) j2 ) + (p2   2) @E(q2(p1;p2)j2 )@p2 = 0. The system of the rst-order
conditions for M1 and M2  R2 yields the expression in (4).
Proof of Proposition 1 . The results in the proposition immediately follow from the rst-
order conditions for p1l and p1h in the maximization problem in (2), and from the rst-order
condition for p2 in the maximization problem in (8). We now show that the incentive constraint
(6) is satised in equilibrium. Substituting the binding incentive constraint (5) into (6), we
obtain
0   E  q1  pai1h; pai2  jh   E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jl    pai1h   l E  q1  pai1h; pai2  jh 
 E  q1  pai1h; pai2  jl +  pai1l   h E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jh   E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jl  .
Since we have E
 
q1
 
pai1h; p
ai
2
 jk   E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jk  + @E(q1(pai1l ;pai2 )jk )@p1  pai1h   pai1l, k =
l; h from Taylors expansion, this expression can be rewritten after some manipulation in the
following way
0   E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jh   pai1h   pai1l  @E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jh @p1  pai1h   h  pai1h   pai1l
+ E
 
q1
 
pai1l ; p
ai
2
 jl   pai1h   pai1l+ @E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jl @p1  pai1h   l  pai1h   pai1l
=    pai1h   pai1l E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jh   E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jl 
+
@E
 
q1
 
pai1l ; p
ai
2
 jh 
@p1
 
pai1h   h
  @E  q1  pai1l ; pai2  jl 
@p1
 
pai1h   l
#
.
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The expression in square brackets is (strictly) positive, since @q1@p2 > 0,
@2q1
@p1@p2
 0 and costs are
(weakly) positively correlated. As pai1h   pai1l > 0, the constraint (6) is satised in equilibrium.
Finally, we check that the participation constraint R1l  0 is also satised in equilibrium. Note
from the binding incentive constraint (5) that su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for this
to be the case is that either the degree of cost correlation or the level substitutability is not too
high.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denoting by z the left-hand side of (10), the implicit function theorem
yields @p
ai
1l
@ =  
@z(pai1l ;)=@
@z(pai1l ;)=@p1l
. Standard computations entail
@z
 
pai1l ; 

@
= E
 
@q1
 
pai1l ; p
ai
2

@p2
@pai2
@
jl
!
+
 
pai1l   l

E
 
@2q1
 
pai1l ; p
ai
2

@p1@p2
@pai2
@
jl
!
< 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model, pai1l   l > 0,
and @p
ai
2
@ < 0 (see below). Since
@z(pai1l ;)
@p1l
< 0 (second-order condition for p1l), it follows that
@pai1l
@ < 0.
Denoting by f the left-hand side of (10) yields @p
ai
1h
@ =  
@f(pai1h;)=@
@f(pai1h;)=@p1h
< 0, where the
inequality follows from
@f(pai1h;)
@ < 0 (the term in square brackets in (10) is negative) and
@f(pai1h;)
@p1h
< 0 (second-order condition for p1h).
Denoting by g the left-hand side of (11) yields @p
ai
2
@ =  
@g(pai2 ;)=@
@g(pai2 ;)=@p2
. We have
@g
 
pai2 ; 

@
= E
 
@q2
 
pai1 ; p
ai
2

@p1
@pai1
@
j2
!
+
 
pai2   2

E
 
@2q2
 
pai1 ; p
ai
2

@p1@p2
@pai1
@
j2
!
< 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumptions of the model, pai2   2 > 0, and @p
ai
1l
@ = 0,
@pai1h
@ < 0 for a given p2. Since
@g(pai2 ;)
@p2
< 0 (second-order condition for p2), it follows that
@pai2
@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating the objective function (12) with respect to the
ownership stake  yields

"
@pai1l
@
E
 
q1
 
pai1l () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jl +  pai1l ()  l @E  q1  pai1l () ; pai2 () jl @
#
+ (1  )

"
@pai1h
@
E
 
q1
 
pai1h () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jh +  pai1h ()  h @E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh @
#
.
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Applying the chain rule yields
@E
 
q1
 
pai1k () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jk 
@
=
@pai1k
@
@E
 
q1
 
pai1k () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jk 
@p1
+ E
"
@q1
 
pai1k () ; p
ai
2 ()

@p2
@pai2
@
jk
#
, k = l; h. (25)
Using (25), we nd after some manipulation

(
@pai1l
@
"
E
 
q1
 
pai1l () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jl +  pai1l ()  l @E  q1  pai1l () ; pai2 () jl @p1
#
+
 
pai1l ()  l

E
"
@q1
 
pai1l () ; p
ai
2 ()

@p2
@pai2
@
jl
#)
+ (1  )

(
@pai1h
@
"
E
 
q1
 
pai1h () ; p
ai
2 ()
 jh +  pai1h ()  h @E  q1  pai1h () ; pai2 () jh @p1
#
+
 
pai1h ()  h

E
"
@q1
 
pai1h () ; p
ai
2 ()

@p2
@pai2
@
jh
#)
. (26)
Note from (9) that the expression in the rst line of (26) is zero, while the expressions in the
second and fourth line are negative as pai1l   l > 0, pai1h   h > 0, @q1@p2 > 0, and
@pai2
@ < 0 (see
the proof of Lemma 2). We nd from (10) that the expression in square brackets in the third
line is zero at  = 1, which implies that  < 1 is optimal. If @q1@p2 = 0 (independent demands),
the rst-order condition (26) is zero for  = 1, which is optimal (given that the second-order
conditions are satised).
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (1), M1s problem of maximizing (2) can be written as
max
p1k;R1k
p1k (  p1k + p2k)  k (  p1k + p2k)  (1  )R1k
s:t: R1k  0, k = l; h,
where the constraint ensures the participation of R1 (with costs l or h) in the contractual
relationship with M1. Since the maximand is decreasing in R1k for any  2 [0; 1], we have
R1k = 0 in equilibrium. After taking the rst-order condition for p1k we nd    2p1k +
p2k + k = 0.
Using (3), the problem of M2  R2 is
max
p2k
p2k (  p2k + p1k)  k (  p2k + p1k) , k = l; h,
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which yields    2p2k + p1k + k = 0. The system of the rst-order conditions for M1 and
M2  R2 yields the expression in (14).
Proof of Proposition 3. The participation constraint R1h  0 for the ine¢ cient retailer
and the incentive constraint (5) for the e¢ cient retailer are binding at the optimal contract.
Substituting them and using (13), M1s problem of maximizing its prots in (2) is
max
p1l;p1h
 fp1l (  p1l + p2l)  l (  p1l + p2l)  (1  ) [ (  p1h + p2h)
  (p2h   p2l) (p1h   l)]g+ (1  ) fp1h (  p1h + p2h)  h (  p1h + p2h)g .
The rst-order conditions for p1l and p1h are respectively given by    2p1l + p2l + l = 0
and   2p1h + p2h + h +  () (1  ) [ +  (p2h   p2l)] = 0.
After substituting (13) into (3), we can write the maximization problem of M2   R2 as
follows
max
p2k
p2k (  p2k + p1k)  k (  p2k + p1k) , k = l; h,
which yields    2p2k + p1k + k = 0. The rst-order conditions for the maximization
problems of M1 and M2  R2 yield the results in the proposition.
We now check that the two omitted constraints in M1s problem are satised in equi-
librium. Substituting the binding constraint (15) into (16) yields after some manipulation
0     pai1h   pai1l  +   pai2h   pai2l, which is fullled since pai1h   pai1l > 0 and pai2h   pai2l > 0.
Moreover, the binding constraint (15) implies that su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for
the participation constraint R1l  0 to be satised is that  is not too high.
Proof of Proposition 4. The maximization problem of M1 is
max
2[0;1]


pai1l
 
  pai1l + pai2l
  l    pai1l + pai2l
+ (1  ) pai1h    pai1h + pai2h  h    pai1h + pai2h .
Using the results in Proposition 3, the rst-order condition for  can be written as
(
  () 43   2 (+ h) 42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2
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 2 () (+ h)
 
42   2+  () (1  ) 43   2 (+ h)
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2
)
+
(
  (   )
 
42   2 (+ h)
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]    () (1  )
2
2
 
22   2   2 (+ h) (   )
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]
)
+
(
(+ h)
 
42   2+  () (1  ) 43   2 (+ h)
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]   h
)

(
 ()
22
 
22   2   2 (+ h) (   ) 42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2
+ 2 ()
"
(   )  42   2 (+ h)
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2 +  () (1  )
2
2
 
22   2   2 (+ h) (   )
(2   ) [42   2 (1 +  () (1  ))]2
#)
= 0.
Combining terms yields after some manipulation
 () (1  )  42   2 432 (2   )  + 22  22   2   2 (+ h) (   )
 43   2 (+ h)+ 2 22  22   2   2 (+ h) (   ) (+ h)
+22
 
22   2 43   2 (+ h) + 222 (2   )  22   2h	
+
 
42   22  43 (2   )  + 43 (   ) (+ h) 
+22
 
22   2 (+ h)    22 (2   )  22   2h = 0.
Further simplications imply
 () (1  )83  22   2 + 4 [  (   ) h]	 2  42   2 [  (   ) h] = 0,
which yields the equilibrium ownership stake in (23). Points (i) and (ii) of the proposition
follow from straightforward computations.
Proof of Proposition 5. Di¤erentiating (24) with respect to  yields

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@aiR1l
@
,
where aiR1l is dened by the binding constraint (15). Since for  = 1 the expressions in the two
curly brackets are negative (see the proof of Proposition 2), while the last term in the fourth
line vanishes, su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the entire expression to be negative
and therefore  < 1 be optimal is that the probability  is low enough.
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